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Abstract 
Computing and technology have vastly changed since the 
introduction of firewall technology in 1988. The internet has 
grown from a simple network of networks to a cyber and physical 
entity that encompasses the entire planet. Cyber-physical 
systems(CPS) now control most of the day to day operations of 
human civilization from autonomous cars to nuclear energy 
plants. While phenomenal, this growth spurt has created new 
security threats. These are threats that cannot be blocked by a 
firewall for they are not only cyber but cyber-physical. In 
light of these new cyber-physical threats, this text proposes a 
security measure that promises to enhance the security of 
cyber-physical systems. Using theoretical cyber, physical, and 
cyber-physical attack scenarios, this text will highlight the 
need for some sort of monitor in cyber-physical systems as an 
extra security measure. Additionally, this text will illustrate 
the efficiency of said monitor using a Shannon entropy proof, 
and a multiple security domain nondeducibility(MSDND) proof. 
I. Introduction 
In May of 2017, a ransomware attack held most of the 
developed world hostage. Crippling healthcare systems, 
manufacturing systems and multiple critical infrastructures 
across the globe. The British National Health Services was 
forced to limit health care to only emergency cases​[7]​. If not for 
a timely kill switch, the attack could have brought forth 
catastrophic damage to nuclear plants, aero transportation 
systems, and many other infrastructures. The Wannacry​[4] 
ransomware attack is simply one recent example of a now fully 
grown threat. Because cyber-physical systems (CPS), are physical 
entities with cyber functionality, traditional cybersecurity 
measures are simply not sufficient to mitigate the threat posed 
by this new wave of cyber-physical attacks​[1]​. While traditional 
cyber attacks were easily deducible and susceptible to 
prevention by means of a firewall or antivirus software, 
Karnouskos shows that recent attacks like the Iran Stuxnet​[4] 
attack could go undetected for long periods of time​[5]​. A search 
for a solution to these threats should, therefore, focus on 
making the occurrence of such attacks almost impossible, and if 
the attacks remain possible, then they should at least be 
swiftly deducible. 
The protection of cyber-physical systems cannot solely 
depend on the effectiveness of a single detection mechanism​[5]​. 
However, the majority of the proposed Cyber-physical security 
measures have centered around the notion of a single monitoring 
unit. The Shadow Security Unit(SSU)​[17]​ proposed by Cruz is a 
viable idea, but considering that the SSU is a single unit that 
employs only cybersecurity measures, a cyber attack that targets 
the central monitoring unit itself, if not detected early, could 
be fatal to the rest of the CPS. ​Scaglione, Peisert, and 
McParland ​acknowledge the need for both a centralized and 
distributed monitor but the proposed monitor is only an 
algorithm​[14]​. While it’s a great algorithm, it’s still a cyber 
measure which will inevitably be vulnerable to some cyber 
attack. The same could be said about the Intrusion Detection 
Systems(IDSs)​[15]​, that is, IDSs are also a single cyber measure. 
This research, therefore, proposes the addition of a hybrid 
monitor spread over virtual nodes with randomized features. This 
addition to a CPS would provide a much-needed auxiliary layer of 
security and also enhance attack deductibility. 
This text is arranged as follows; Section II takes a close 
look at the tools used in testing the viability of the proposed 
hybrid monitor as a security measure for CPS. Section III gives 
a comprehensive look at the hybrid monitor, listing its features 
and the reasoning behind each feature. Section IV explains the 
methodology used to test the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
hybrid monitor. Section V presents the test scenarios. Section 
VI presents a conclusion that mentions the significance of and 
limitations to employing the hybrid monitor in cyber-physical 
systems. 
II. Background 
This research employs the Future Renewable Electric Energy 
Delivery and Management (FREEDM)​[2]​ System as a model CPS. Shannon 
entropy​[8]​ is used as a tool to test the effectiveness of the 
monitor as a security measure. The multiple security domain 
nondeducibility(MSDND)​[1]​ is used as a tool to test the 
effectiveness of the monitor in detecting attacks. 
The FREEDM system center is a multi-million dollar 
engineering research center funded by the National Science 
Foundation. The research center developed an energy management 
and distribution smart grid system that is also referred to as 
FREEDM​[2]​. The heart of this energy system is the Distributed Grid 
Intelligence(DGI)​[2]​, an intelligent algorithm that implements 
energy management and distribution using modular adapters to 
interact with devices in a smart grid over different interfaces. 
In this text, the FREEDM system is employed as a test subject 
for the implementation of the hybrid monitor proposed by this 
research. 
The MSDND model is a security model that tests the 
integrity and confidentiality of a cyber-physical architecture. 
The MSDND model uses logic proofs to test information flow 
security; how information moves among user groups within the 
security domains (SDs) that make up the system​[1]​. Howser and 
Mcmillin show that maintaining information flow security in CPS 
is challenging because the flow is irrevocably linked among the 
CPS’ cyber and physical units​[1]​. Therefore, the MSDND model is 
employed to account for both cyber and physical information flow 
paths. The model defines two system properties namely: MSDND 
secure and notMSDND secure​[1]​. An MSDND secure system implies that 
for information flowing from entity A to entity B, entity B 
cannot deduce whether the information is valid or erroneous. 
This also means while an MSDND secure system is desirable if the 
goal is to maintain confidentiality, it can also be an indicator 
of the possibility of an attack going undetected. A notMSDND 
secure system implies the alternative, that is, entity B can 
evaluate the correctness of information obtained from entity A. 
Therefore, in the event of an attack, Howser, and McMillin shows 
that a notMSDND secure system could easily detect the occurrence 
of an attack​[1]​. Thudimila and McMillin demonstrate the 
superiority of MSDND over traditional electronic and 
cryptographic solutions​[3]​ when applied to detection of attacks in 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast(ADS-B) air traffic 
surveillance system​[3]​. For this research, MSDND is used to 
analyze whether a CPS with a hybrid monitor in place would 
deduce the occurrence of an attack. 
Phan, Malacaria, Corina S. Pasareanu, and d’Amorim 
introduce the idea of using information flow-metrics like 
Shannon entropy to measure information leakage in CPS programs​[9]​. 
Li uses Shannon Entropy to break down the physical dynamics of 
CPS and goes on to show the negative entropy that communication 
adds to the general entropy of a CPS​[10]​. In this text, Shannon 
Entropy is used to illustrate the decrease in the possibility of 
an attack in a CPS after the introduction of a monitor. This 
demonstrates the value of adding a monitor to CPS architectures 
as an extra security measure. 
Shannon entropy is an information theory concept derived 
from the general idea of information entropy that was developed 
and introduced by Claude Shannon​[8]​. Entropy is basically a 
measure of uncertainty in a communication system where a low 
entropy value implies minimal uncertainty and a high entropy 
implies the contrary. Shannon entropy defines entropy (​H​) as: 
 
H(X) = E[I(X)] 
 
Where I is the information content of the discrete random 
variable ​X​. Therefore we can further define ​E[I(X)]​ in terms of 
the probability mass function of X: i.e, 
E[I(X) = E[-ln(P(X))] = -​i=1nP(xi)log[P(xi)] 
 
 
The generally definition of entropy ​H​ then comes to: 
H(X) = -​i=1nP(xi)log[P(xi)] 
 
III. The Hybrid Monitor 
To better protect cyber-physical systems, this research 
proposes the addition of a monitor. Many other researchers have 
explored the use of hybrid monitoring to ensure safety or/and 
security in CPSs. ​Ye-Jing, Ming-Cai, Guang-Quan, Yu-Zhen, Fei, 
and Xing-Hua​ ​propose extended hybrid automata modeling for 
vehicular CPSs as a safety and control measure​[11]​. ​Mao and Chen 
also introduce a runtime hybrid automaton monitoring framework 
for the Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control Systems(CACC)​[12]​. 
This research borrows the idea of hybrid monitoring but with 
randomization as an additional feature. The addition of 
randomization in information flow paths’ generation increases 
the system’s entropy and in turn, reduces the chances of a 
successful attack in a generic CPS. That is because a higher 
number of information flow paths increases the number of points 
the attacker has to corrupt to remain undetected. Below is a 
full detailed break down of this hybrid monitor’s features; 
● The monitor is hybrid, that is both virtual and physical, 
central and decentralized. The monitor would have both a 
virtual component and physical component. The virtual 
components would be implemented as a hidden algorithm in 
every ​Supervisory control and data acquisition​( ​SCADA) in 
the CPS. The physical component of the monitor would be a 
physical unit independent of the entire CPS and running a 
monitoring algorithm whose function is to oversee the 
operations of the monitor’s virtual components. The 
physical component is, therefore, a central unit and the 
virtual components are the decentralized units. 
● The monitor should be intelligent enough to generate 
physical invariants for every information flow path in the 
CPS. An invariant is simply a logical assertion that should 
always be true throughout an execution cycle. Therefore 
physical invariants are logical properties of a CPS that 
cannot be transformed by cyber entities and should always 
be held true. Having physical invariants makes the CPS 
vastly more secure because they are secure from being 
corrupted by cyber attacks. With that in mind, the hybrid 
monitor uses generated physical invariants as a validator 
of the information received from other system modules. The 
automated generation of physical invariant using machine 
learning, deep learning or linear regression is also a 
viable research area. The automation of invariant 
generation is explored further by Cruz​[16]​. 
● The virtual components of the monitors would continuously 
generate a randomly increasing number of paths for the flow 
of information between any two CPS entities. The physical 
monitor should also generate a randomly increasing number 
of virtual paths as a compliment to a physical path for the 
flow of information between any two virtual components of 
the monitor. 
● All paths generated by the monitor should be independent of 
each other. This ensures that all the randomly generated 
paths cannot be collectively corrupted by an attacker. 
● To reduce the information flow overhead, information sent 
through the monitors should be sent through a randomly 
chosen path among the generated paths and then white noise 
should be transmitted on the rest of the paths. 
● The monitor should have a routing algorithm that can be 
employed if the monitor detects a failure or corruption at 
any of the CPS’ entities. 
 
IV. Methodology 
This research uses two methods to highlight the 
significance of introducing a hybrid monitor to a CPS. 
Method one 
The research employs attack scenarios to examine the 
security of a CPS with and without the hybrid monitor. There are 
three attack scenarios, that is; A purely cyber attack like a 
ransomware on a CPS, a completely physical attack like the 
attacker inflicting physical damage to the CPS by, for example, 
cutting wires and a cyber-physical attack like the Iran Stuxnet 
attack expounded upon in Kushner’s​[4]​ and Karnouskos’​[5]​ work. 
Method two 
In the second method, the research uses two proof models 
i.e Shannon entropy and MSDND to show that the addition of a 
hybrid monitor makes a CPS less susceptible to an undetected 
attack and much more effective at deducing attacks when they do 
occur. 
V. Research Results 
This section details the three attack scenarios, their 
respective results, the Shannon entropy proof, and MSDND proof. 
Cyber Attack scenario 
As mentioned in the background, the FREEDM system is 
controlled by a distributed algorithm called the DGI. The DGI is 
set up to run on multiple nodes spread out over a network. It 
provides an interface for energy management applications to 
communicate with physical power devices. 
 
Let’s assume that a DGI node is being held hostage by the 
wannaCry ransomware. This kind of attack is rather easy to 
detect because ransomware attacks normally make the user aware 
that the attack is in progress. Therefore, for this scenario, 
attack deductibility is not important. But because the attacker 
is holding a node hostage, all information flowing through this 
node could be infected by the attacker. This could give the 
attacker further access to other nodes since all nodes of the 
DGI share state information. At this point, it’s clear that the 
entire DGI could be held hostage. Since the DGI manages the 
entire FREEDM smart grid system, the entire CPS would be either 
rendered useless or could be left vulnerable to more damaging 
attacks. 
Now let’s consider a scenario where a hybrid monitor was in 
place with virtual units running alongside every DGI node and a 
physical unit to oversee the virtual units. Because all traffic 
that goes through a node is verified by the monitor and 
subjected to physical invariants generated by the monitor, it 
would be easy for the monitor to flag the presence of the 
ransomware. Since the monitor has information flow routing 
capabilities, all state information from other nodes would be 
safely rerouted through other nodes. While the infected node 
would not be saved, the rest of the DGI would continue to 
function without threat. 
Physical Attack scenario 
For this scenario, we assume that an attacker has inflicted 
physical damage to the CPS without using cyber means. The damage 
could be as simple as cutting an ethernet cord or breaking a 
sensor. The detection and solution for such an attack are also 
rather simple. However, if the CPS is a critical infrastructure 
like a nuclear reactor that needs to continuously keep some 
functions fully operational then even this simple attack could 
prove fatal. With a monitor in place, any failure in the CPS 
would quickly be detected. The monitor, through information flow 
rerouting, would go even further to keep critical functions 
running while the damage gets fixed. 
Cyber-physical Attack scenario 
The third and last scenario assumes that a microcontroller 
in FREEDM system is infected by Stuxnet. Erroneous Information 
from this microcontroller could cause catastrophic damage to the 
smart grid. In this case, deducing the presence of the Stuxnet 
and reducing the damage to the smart grid are both necessary. 
 
From the Iran attack, it’s clear that the Stuxnet could go 
unnoticed for a long time if no extra security measure is put in 
place. Although, if the FREEDM system had a hybrid monitor, the 
Stuxnet would be detected because all information from the 
microcontroller would have to be verified by the monitor. Since 
the monitor has physical invariants to prove the correctness of 
information from this microcontroller, any discrepancies in the 
information generated by the Stuxnet would be caught. On 
detection, information flow would then be routed through other 
nodes and further infection would be avoided. The Stuxnet would 
have to infect all random paths used by the hybrid monitor to 
avoid detection. The Shannon Entropy proof below shows that 
there is a very small possibility of the Stuxnet or attacker 
infecting all of the hybrid monitor’s random paths. 
MSDND proof 
For this proof, let’s look at the cyber-physical Stuxnet 
attack shown above. More specifically, the information path 
between the infected microcontroller and the DGI node process 
running on the computer without the monitor. 
 
Let us define the two domains as SD​node​ for the DGI node and 
SD​mic​ for the microcontroller with valuation functions V​node​ and 
V​mic​ respectively. Then consider a scenario where arbitrary 
information (φ) is sent from the infected microcontroller to the 
DGI node process. If the DGI node process and microcontroller 
are at the same level of security, then the DGI node process 
will trust that information from the infected microcontroller to 
be valid. Since the information can be either true or false, the 
first condition; i.e,.. (SD​φ​mic​ SD​¬φ​mic​ ) for MSDND is met​[1]​. This 
is derived from the fact that if φ is true then SD​φ​mic​ is true or 
if φ is false then SD​¬φ​mic​ is true hence the xor statement is 
always true. 
The second condition is also satisfied from the assumption 
that the two domains are at the same security level​[1]​. Therefore, 
the DGI node process believes and trusts the infected 
microcontroller. This means the DGI node process has no 
valuation function to prove the validity of φ​[1]​. The absence of 
this valuation function (V​φ​node​) leaves the system in an MSDND 
secure system​[1]​. Hence the MSDND secure evaluation; 
MSDND = ∀​w ∊ W​ : ​w ​⊦ [SD​φ​mic​ SD​¬φ​mic​ ] ⋀ [​w ​⊧ {∄V​φ​node​ (​w​) ⋀ 
∄V​
ㄱφ​
node​ (​w​)}] 
The implication of this MSDND evaluation is that if the infected 
microcontroller sent false information to the DGI node process, 
there would be no way of evaluating that the information is 
false. Therefore the Stuxnet would go undetected. Knowing this, 
let us take a look at a scenario with the monitor in place. 
 
The difference in this scenario is the presence of a 
monitor that is equipped with physical invariants. Using a 
physical invariant, the monitor can evaluate the validity of φ. 
With this, the monitor can also determine the state of the 
microcontroller with respect to the validity of φ; i.e,.. There 
exist a valuation V​φ​mon ​leaving the state SD​φ​mic​ deducible​[1]​. Hence 
the notMSDND secure evaluation; 
MSDND = ∀​w ∊ W​ : ​w ​⊦ [SD​φ​mic​ SD​¬φ​mic​ ] ⋀ [​w ​⊧ {∃V​φ​mon​ (​w​) ⋀ 
∃V​
ㄱφ​
mon​ (​w​)}] 
The proof shows that in the event of a cyber-physical 
attack like the Stuxnet attack, the presence of a monitor would 
render the attack deducible. For the attack to go undetected 
with a monitor in place, the attacker would have to infect every 
single monitor node, both virtual and physical. The next Shannon 
entropy proof will show that the possibility of compromising all 
the monitor nodes without being detected is rather minimal. 
Shannon Entropy proof. 
The proof considers two scenarios where the attacker is 
attempting to infect the information flow between the DGI node 
process and the microcontroller. 
First, let us take a look at the entropy of the setup 
without the monitor. There are two possible information flow 
events x1and x2that the attack could target. With a sample space 
= 2, the probability of the attacker successfully infecting 
information flow between the DGI node process and 
microcontroller is ½. The entropy evaluation for this scenario 
is shown below. 
 
With a monitor in place, the sample space grows to (2n + 
2), making the probability of successfully corrupting one path 
come to 1/[2(n + 1)]. Here is the entropy evaluation; 
 The proof shows us that the entropy increases with the 
increase in the size of n paths. From the attacker’s point of 
view, the uncertainty increases with increasing size of n paths. 
Therefore as the size of n increases, it becomes much harder for 
the attacker to launch a successful attack on the CPS. By adding 
the hybrid monitor, the system is not fully secure from an 
attack but the possibility of a successful attack is vastly 
smaller. 
VI. Conclusion 
After 2017’s Ransomware attack​[9]​, the world can not ignore 
the threat posed by the possibility of using attacks on 
cyber-physical systems as a tool for terrorism and cyber 
warfare. The increased occurrence of cyber-physical systems 
attacks is surely an indicator that traditional cybersecurity 
measures are insufficient at prevention and detection of these 
attacks. The world needs to start considering alternative or 
improved security measures. The combination of an intelligent, 
randomized physical monitor with existing virtual cyber measures 
to create a hybrid monitor is a good place to start. While, the 
hybrid monitor is not a foolproof solution to cyber-physical 
attacks, it could well be the best solution yet. Future research 
in this area should focus on physical implementation of the 
hybrid monitor and prevention of attacks targeting the hybrid 
monitor itself. This hybrid monitor could be the great leap 
towards fully securing an important and nonexpendable entity of 
smart living that is cyber-physical systems. 
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